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Relativity and spatio-temporal present. <Occasional givenness of the world and over-occasional truths>[[1]](#footnote-1)

The statements concerning the world presuppose the universal experiential world in its occasional way of givenness. An infinity, a world can only be given to cognizing subjects in an occasional, in a subjectively oriented way. It is necessary to first of all distinguish for each subject: its current spatio-temporal present and the open-unknown or the (“inductively”) anticipated from the speciality of the former experience in more or less determined speciality – the world horizon.[[2]](#footnote-2) If within the universal process of the experience an endless identical world shall always be conscious, then this world horizon, except for the special, inductively predelineated, must have a disclosable universal and necessary sense; the world has to carry a necessary **ontological** form as form of all anticipations of something ont<ic> and at the same time a **necessary form of occasionality**, a universal form, like the ont<ic> appears in subjective modes from each occasion, that is, oriented. The form of the close, concrete present with empty horizon belongs to this, and also [with] an inductive horizon as occasional drawing into this emptiness containing only a formal sense.

This is transferred to the intersubjectivity. Men, being within a current and immediate communication-community, have **intersubjectively** a **common close sphere**, a concrete common **present**.[[3]](#footnote-3) Within it the common present close things **[711]** in mutually understandable subjective modes. Of course we have again an intersubjective horizon belonging to it. This now results in a possible mutual communication concerning the common in its occasionality and intersubjective truth, which, related to this occasion, is **intersubjective-relative**. But it needs to be stated that the present can temporally spread for me over my whole former life, insofar as I can represent it to me within the unity of a universal memory; and likewise for the community of many, as far as they live commonly and are able to overlook a unity of common life by way of memory. But here the de facto possibilities are already limited. Present relativizes itself, but in a communalized way we do not live within a constant or far reaching continuity. In general we are together here and now, this afternoon as a community within this room, and we have a field of true descriptive statements, which we exchange, the experiential evidence of which we can regenerate – but simply “occasionally” related to this “present”.[[4]](#footnote-4)

How do we gain “**objectively accepted**”, rather **non-occasional** statements and true ones? How do we gain truths which we can justify, review, verify intersubjectively, while our current presents are different and the occasional of each statement for the others, not partaking in this occasional, is not to be found within their current near world. **[712]** This problem taken in ideal generality. Certainly a relation of understanding, but a mediate one and somehow ideally to be produced is presupposed, but not in that kind that an actually common present (near world) emerges thereby. The judgments concerning the world of physical things want to be judgments concerning the things themselves, but the occasional relates to them in the mode of the way of givenness within the occasion, that is, not purely the way they are, but <the way they> are given for us within our occasion. That which is sufficient for practical interests, on which alone it is usually dependent.

Since the things are experienced and experienceable as being **identical** within the change of occasional ways of givenness, and have their lasting being and being-in-themselves exactly within this identity, these are determinations of the things in their **over-occasional identity going through all possible occasions**, substrates of “lasting” properties, lasting changes (of what belongs to them in general), free from all occasional. Each and everything having its own being, its truth, is within a relativity of subjective modes of givenness and demands an over-occasional determination.

1) A realm of such truths in themselves results with relation to the sense-structure of a world, as a world of manifold occasional experiences like it is identical and shall be able to be identical with its subjective modes. If within the continuous stream a world is experienced as an identical one at all, if thus each experience has its open-endless, but still senseful horizon, then it should be able to *a priori* disclose a **form of the world** from there. And all judgments being related to **this** necessarily are **overoccasional**, and are necessarily common to all subjects being related to the same world as experiencing ones, for all <subjects> entering a possible, however mediate understanding. Likewise the **formal of the subjective ways of givenness** of a world according to its form, and according to all the types of being belonging to the form, types of relation, etc.

2) But if it shall be possible to determine what the world is itself and what its realities are themselves – a de facto given and for us this world -, then it needs to be considered that it is and can be only given as this individual de facto [world] respectively, in an oriented way, occasionally, from a present.

**[713]** It thus must be possible to find a method, from the present and from the truths determining it occasionally, in occasional concepts, which necessarily are the first ones, to gain non-occasional <truths> with non-occasional concepts, that is, truths in themselves, which on the one hand present the general essential conformities to the law which beyond the conformities of the apriori form of the world exactly belong to the de facto world and have themselves only a de facto character – provided something of that kind exists or that the ontological apriori prescribes that a world must be conforming to the law -, and on the other hand <to make available> a method of determination of individual things <which permits to proceed> from individually given <things>, determined within non-occasional concepts <to the determination of> non-given <things>, and eventually, even if within a regulated progress, <to the determination> of all – ideally.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Every real thing has, after the apriori form of the world has been unveiled and is explicated in sciences, its non-occasional determination purely within the application of these formal truths, but a determination which does not distinguish it from any other real thing (at least of its region). If it is possible to find special laws of the world through the guidance of the formal knowledge of the world, these are again leading for an individual cognizance of the facts.

But thereby the like inner thus external **infinity** of the closer determination is not explicitly taken into account, which necessarily belongs to a world of experience, through <which> each real thing and initially natural real thing is an **ideal pole of a line of approximation** according to its being-in-itself. This leads to the basic method of all objective cognizance of reality, the idealization, and, if an individual determination shall be possible, to methods of measuring nature. In contrast to that the open problem, in how far it is conceivable at all to anticipate mentality in this way, that is in general, whether and in how far the problem of a cognizance of the world must be limited through truths in themselves, or, vice versa, in how far it has a sense and right and necessity.

1. Probably September 1926. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Experience as self-giving consciousness of an endless world is only conceivable as self-giving with a rather experienced content and a horizon with the sense of a limitless, ever anew to be performed process of possible experience, of a process which again is only conceivable in ever the same form and together with the form according to ever the same contents. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. It has been overlooked that a de facto coincidence within the presumptive horizons, a coincidence within the sensuousness and the essential real apperceptions, through which the close world essentially has the same experiential sense and generally verifies, fulfills itself everywhere in the same way. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Every man and each currently-immediately communicating community of men is with an occasion, within a situation, de facto: But now an explanation is missing that the givennesses of each close sphere, that is, from it the actually having been actualized, are one-sided, in general within an orientation that there is an occasion as well: One is within an “attitude”. And that which is properly given has its sense-horizon, and to this belongs: 1) the interreal causality, 2) the relativity to the senses. In both kinds of regard, like it has been explicated elsewhere, each experiential judgment is only valid in a relative way, has its usually unknown presumptions, that is, undetermined general ones which first of all have to be determined. Therefore it <does> not <have> any objective validity. But still it is possible for many, being in the same situation – a de facto harmony of their functioning sensuousness and a de facto harmony of their general experience -, to arrive at agreeing judgments. Their horizons of presumption are the same. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. But this order, which first mentions laws of facts and then single facts, is wrong. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)